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Issues with Voluntary Reporting by Train Drivers and Their Impact on the Railway
İlker Ünder, Kadir Aksay, Omur Akbayir, Umran Under


For organisations to take preventive measures and eliminate potential accidents, the information gained through voluntary reporting is essential. Employees do not, however, report voluntarily for a number of reasons. In this study, we examine why train drivers, who are vital to maintaining rail safety, fail to report hazardous occurrences, leading to employee silence. The measurement tool, which has already been developed specifically for aviation employees, has been applied to 346 train drivers working on Turkish Railways. The scale used for research purposes has proven to be valid and reliable for organisations involved in railways. As a result, it was determined that the drivers did not participate in voluntary reporting due to relational and prosocial, disengaged, quiescence and acquiescence and fear and defensive factors. The highest score for the reasons for non-reporting was observed in the dimension of quiescence and acquiescence. The results of the correlation analysis between dimensions, which are assumed to be the reasons for non-reporting, point to strong positive relationships between each dimension.


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