References
[1] Rayle L, et al. Just a better taxi? A survey-based comparison of taxis, transit, and ridesourcing services in San Francisco. Transport Policy. 2016;45:168-178. DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2015.10.004.
[2] Dias FF, et al. A behavioral choice model of the use of car-sharing and ride-sourcing services. Transportation. 2017;44:1307-1323. DOI: 10.1007/s11116-017-9797-8.
[3] Alemi F, et al. What drives the use of ridehailing in California? Ordered probit models of the usage frequency of Uber and Lyft. Transportation Research Part C. 2019;102:233-248. DOI: 10.1016/j.trc.2018.12.016.
[4] Tang B, et al. How app-based ride-hailing services influence travel behavior: An empirical study from China. International Journal of Sustainable Transportation. 2020;14(7):554-568. DOI: 10.1080/15568318.2019.1584932.
[5] Loa P, Habib KN. Examining the influence of attitudinal factors on the use of ride-hailing services in Toronto. Transportation Research Part A. 2021;146:13-28. DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2021.02.002.
[6] Hall JD, Palsson C, Price J. Is Uber a substitute or complement for public transit?. Journal of Urban Economics. 2018;108:36-50. DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2018.09.003.
[7] Shaheen S, Totte H, Stocker A. Future of mobility white paper. Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Berkeley; 2018.
[8] Chen JY. Thrown under the bus and outrunning it! The logic of Didi and taxi drivers’ labour and activism in the on-demand economy. New Media & Society. 2017;1-21. DOI: 10.1177/1461444817729149.
[9] Wang S, Noland RB. Variation in ride-hailing trips in Chengdu, China. Transportation Research Part D. 2021;90:102596. DOI: 10.1016/j.trd.2020.102596.
[10] Brail S. World cities of ride-hailing. Urban Geography. 2022;43(1):12-33. DOI: 10.1080/02723638.2020.1775030.
[11] Contreras SD, Paz A. The effects of ride-hailing companies on the taxicab industry in Las Vegas, Bevada. Transportation Research Part A. 2018;115:63-70. DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2017.11.008.
[12] Li Z, Hong Y, Zhang Z. An empirical analysis of on-demand ride sharing and traffic congestion. Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Science, Hawaii, USA. 2017. p. 4-13.
[13] Wirtz J, Tang C. Uber: Competing as market leader in the US versus being a distant second in China. Services Marketing: People Technology Strategy. 2016;626-632. DOI: 10.1142/9781944659028_0019.
[14] Kulińska E, Kulińska K. Development of ride-sourcing services and sustainable city logistics. Transportation Research Procedia. 2019;39:252-259. DOI: 10.1016/j.trpro.2019.06.027.
[15] Katz ML, Shapiro C. Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. The American Economic Review. 1985;75(3):424-440.
[16] Katz ML, Shapiro C. Product introduction with network externalities. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 1992;40(1):55-83.
[17] Lee D, Choi K. The efficiency of competing vertical chains with network externalities. Economics Letters. 2018;168:1-5. DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.019.
[18] Zha L, Yin Y, Yang H. Economic analysis of ride-sourcing markets. Transportation Research Part C. 2016;71:249-266. DOI: 10.1016/j.trc.2016.07.010.
[19] Zha L, Yin Y, Du Y. Surge pricing and labor supply in the ride-sourcing market. Transportation Research Part B. 2018;117:708-722. DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2017.09.010.
[20] Sun L, et al. Optimal pricing for ride-sourcing platforms. European Journal of Operational Research. 2019;278:783-795. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.044.
[21] Wu T, et al. Spatial differentiation and network externality in pricing mechanism of online car hailing platform. International Journal of Production Economics. 2020;219:275-283. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.007.
[22] Yan C, et al. Dynamic pricing and matching in ride-hailing platforms. Naval Research Logistics. 2020;67:705-724. DOI: 10.1002/nav.218.
[23] Hu B, Hu M, Zhu H. Surge pricing and two-sided temporal responses in ride hailing. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. 2021;24(1):91-109. DOI: 10.1287/msom.2020.0960.
[24] Didi. Annual business and social responsibility report. 2022.
https://s28.q4cdn.com/896456191/files/doc_financials/2022/ar/2022-Annual-Business-and-Social-Responsibility-Report.pdf [Accessed 23th Aug. 2023].
[25] Henao A, Marshall WE. An analysis of the individual economics of ride-hailing drivers. Transportation Research Part A. 2019;130:440-451. DOI: 10.1016/j.tra.2019.09.056.
[26] Meskar M, Aslani S, Modarres M. Spatio-temporal pricing algorithm for ride-hailing platforms where drivers can decline ride requests. Transportation Research Part C. 2023;153:104200. DOI: 10.1016/j.trc.2023.104200.
[27] Garg N, Nazerzadeh H. Driver surge pricing. Management Science. 2021;68(5):3219-3235. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4058.
[28] Rochet JC, Tirole J. Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2003;1(4):990-1029. DOI: 10.1162/154247603322493212.
[29] Rochet JC, Tirole J. Two-sided markets: A progress report. RAND Journal of Economics. 2006;37(3):645-667. DOI: 10.1111/J.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x.
[30] Armstrong M. Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics. 2006;37(3):668-691. DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x.
[31] Jang DC, Kim B, Lee SY. A two-sided market platform analysis for the electric vehicle adoption: Firm strategies and policy design. Transportation Research Part D. 2018;62:646-658. DOI: 10.1016/j.trd.2018.02.002.
[32] Belleflamme P, Peitz M. Managing competition on a two-sided platform. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 2019;28(1):5-22. DOI: 10.1111/jems.12311.
[33] Li J, Zhang Y. The side with larger network externality should be targeted aggressively? Monopoly pricing, reference price and two-sided markets. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications. 2020;43:100995. DOI: 10.1016/j.elerap.2020.100995.
[34] Tang F, Chi K. Research on pricing strategy of online group buying in two-sided network [双边网络环境下的网络团购定价策略研究]. Chinese Journal of Management Science. 2013;21(3):185-192. DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2013.03.020.
[35] Hotelling H. Stability in competition. The Economic Journal. 1929;39(153):41-57. DOI: 10.2307/2224214.
[36] Adler N, Brudner A, Proost S. A review of transport market modeling using game-theoretic principles. European Journal of Operational Research. 2021;291:808-829. DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2020.11.020.
[37] Li S, Liu Y, Bandyopadhyay S. Network effects in online two-sided market platforms: A research note. Decision Support Systems. 2010;49:245-249. DOI: 10.1016/j.dss.2010.02.004.
[38] Xu W, Lin G, Zhu X. Bundling strategies for ride-hailing platforms based on price and service level. Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research. 2022;17(2):851-874. DOI: 10.3390/jtaer17020044.
[39] Wei X, et al. Optimal business model for the monopolistic ride-hailing platform: Pooling, premier, or hybrid?. Knowledge-Based Systems. 2020;204:106093. DOI: 10.1016/j.knosys.2020.106093.
[40] Wang M, Mu L. Spatial disparities of Uber accessibility: An exploratory analysis in Atlanta, USA. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems. 2018;67:169-175. DOI: 10.1016/j.compenvurbsys.2017.09.003.
[41] Chen X, et al. Dynamic optimization strategies for on-demand ride services platform: Surge pricing, commission rate, and incentives. Transportation Research Part B. 2020;138:23-45. DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2020.05.005.
