Willingness-to-Comply Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms for Alleviating Local Congestion in Metro Waiting Areas

Abstract

Effectively equilibrating passenger distribution on metro platforms and carriages is important for relieving local congestion. This paper explores the role of incentive mechanisms in encouraging passenger queuing behaviours. To quantitatively analyse passenger compliance with the policy, a questionnaire survey was conducted in Fuzhou, China. According to the preliminary analysis of the survey data, passengers have various moving distance preferences under the incentive scenarios, namely, no movement, smaller distance and greater distance. Additionally, this paper establishes a nested logit model that considers travel purposes and moving distances. The empirical results show that although monetary and point-system incentives can effectively enhance passenger compliance with transfer queue-positioning requirements, when the moving distance is very small, people pay less attention to rewards. Compared to those commuting on weekends, passengers commuting on weekdays comply with policies more strongly, and the effect of implementing incentive policies is better; however, the effect of those policies is reduced among those travelling for leisure. Meanwhile, when travelling for leisure, as the number of companions increases, people’s willingness to follow guidance on where to wait increases. According to the results, the implementation of incentive-based waiting encouragement policies during peak working days can result in good compliance.

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